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INTRODUCTION
The identification of parameters predictive of social
influence has long been an important goal of social
psychology.

Although the current literature still leaves

many issues unresolved, a general rule has emerged from
years of research: there is strength in numbers.

The notion

that faction size plays a critical role in social influence
is central to three different models of social influence
that are relevant to the present paper: social impact theory
(Latane, 1981), other-total ratio (Mullen, 1983), and social
influence model (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). A detailed
description of each model is beyond the scope of this
proposal. However, social impact theory (SIT) will be
discussed most thoroughly, and other-total ratio (OTR)

and

social influence models (SIM) will be contrasted to it.
Models of Social Influence
Social impact theory (Latane, 1981) describes the
process of social influence as a function involving three
variables: strength, immediacy, and number of influence
sources.

These variables are multiplicatively related, as

shown in Equation 1:
I

=

(1)

f (SIN)

where I is influence or impact,

s

is the strength of the

influencing source, I is the immediacy of the source, and N

2

is the number of influencing sources.
Strength refers to the source of influence, and
includes factors such as economic and social status, age,
and past incidents that involved the source exerting power
over the target.

Immediacy refers to the physical

proximity of the source with respect to the target.

Number

refers to the number of influencing sources.
Although Latane considers all three factors (strength,
immediacy, and number) equally important determinants of
social influence, he focuses primarily on certain
psychosocial laws, to be discussed presently. These laws
deal solely with the Number parameter in Equation 1. The
first psychosocial law, shown in Equation 2:
(2)

suggests that the amount of social impact (I) a target will
experience is equal to a scaling constant (s) multiplied by
the number of influencing sources (N) raised to some
exponent (t).

The exponent will always be less than one,

and the first few sources of influence will have a stronger
impact upon the target than will the subsequent sources
because impact is assumed to be related to a root of the
number of influencing sources.

Latane argues that just as a

target presumably experiences a stronger and more powerful
form of influence as the number of sources increases, a
source's influential force will be divided amongst the

3

targets as the number of targets increases.

This is

represented by the second psychosocial law, presented in
Equation 3:
I=sN~

(3)

This law implies that each individual target will be less
influenced or persuaded by an influential message as the
number of targets increases.
Most empirical tests of social impact theory have been
directed towards the two psychosocial laws, rather than the
complete model proposed by Latane.

The diverse nature of

dependent variables used in these studies suggests that
these laws adequately describe social influence in many
domains (e.g., tipping in restaurants, stage fright, worker
productivity, classroom behavior, bystander intervention;
see Latane, 1981, for a review). However, the value of the
exponent (t) is allowed to vary from study to study without
theoretical explanation.

The empirically derived value

assigned to the exponent has led some theorists to argue
that the psychosocial laws lack predictive power (Mullen,
1985).

It is important to note, though, that the

psychosocial laws are indeed predictive in that they predict
the function form for patterns associated with influence
produced by different sized factions (e.g., marginally
decreasing impact). These patterns predicted by SIT have
received considerable support and Latane has actually shown
that data from past research, when reanalyzed, are in line
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with SIT (Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Connolley, 1968; Latane &
Darley, 1970; 1975).
Self-attention theory (Carver & Sheier, 1981) serves as
the theoretical foundation for a second model of social
influence, the other-total ratio (Mullen, 1983).

This model

proposes that faction size alone predicts social influence,
and that for any individual the OTR is equal to the number
of members in his/her opposing faction divided by the total
number of group members. For example the OTR for a single
individual facing a majority of 3 would be 3/4.

This model

makes predictions quite similar to those of the psychosocial
laws proposed by Latane in that it proposes that influence
should increase in a marginally decreasing fashion as
members are added to the opposing faction.

This similarity

in predictions, as well as the relative lack of empirical
data in support of Latane's complete model of social
influence, has led Mullen (1985) to argue that the
other-total ratio is a more parsimonious conceptualization
of social influence (but see Jackson, 1986, for a
counterargument).
The third model of social influence (Tanford & Penrod,
1984) differs from SIT in that it assumes individual
differences in

susceptibility to persuasion, and includes a

parameter corresponding to such differences.

Another

parameter of SIM corresponds to the interactive nature of
influence and allows for reciprocal influence effects.

It
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should be noted, however, that Jackson (1987) extended SIT
so that it is also capable of capturing the interactive
nature of social influence.

A parameter unique to SIM takes

into account the consistency level of the sources. Lastly,
SIM, like the previously discussed models, considers the
number of influencing sources to be a critical predictor of
influence.
Perhaps the largest difference between SIM and SIT,
notwithstanding the additional parameters, is that SIM
predicts that influence will reach an asymptote at N=4 in
most majority paradigms.

SIT, on the other hand, predicts

no limit or absolute amount of influence
experienced by a target, and,

that may be

thus, the addition of sources

will always result in an increase in influence.

It is for

this reason that the data from the Asch studies (1951; 1952;
1956) do not fit the pattern predicted by the SIT
psychosocial laws. Asch found that the amount of influence
did not systematically increase with the addition of
sources, but, rather, leveled off after the third source of
influence was added.
Empirical Test of the Three Models
Despite the differences in the predictions made by each
of the three models discussed, Tindale, Davis, Vollrath,
Nagao & Hinsz (1990) have shown that there are almost no
differences in the degree to which the models can fit the
data collected in a model-testing investigation. Predictions
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made by SIT, SIM, and OTR, were tested in freely interacting
groups. Tindale et al. (1990) also manipulated group
composition (the number of minority and majority members),
counterbalanced for the direction in which group members
argued, and group size (ranging from three to six).
Perhaps the most relevant finding with respect to this
proposal is that shifts indicating that the minority faction
was influential were found in only three out of twelve
groups that had a minority faction (i.e., groups comprised
of four majority members favoring a guilty verdict/two
minority members favoring a not guilty verdict, three
majority members favoring a guilty verdict/two minority
members favoring a not guilty verdict, and two majority
members favoring a guilty verdict/one minority member
favoring a not guilty verdict).

It is important to note

here that group composition alone cannot account for these
shifts because group composition was counterbalanced for
argument direction, and three group compositions with the
majority favoring not guilty

did not show the slight shift

toward the minority position. Most surprisingly, the
majority factions of the remaining nine groups shifted in a
direction opposite that of the minority faction and became
more extreme. These results do not correspond to the
predictions made by any of the three models of

social

influence tested, because SIT, SIM and OTR predict that
minority members have some impact, however slight, upon the
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majority members.
Although these data appear to show that minorities
(especially minorities of one) have basically no impact
(under some circumstances) on the opinions of the majority
group members, such a conclusion is premature.

It is

possible that the minority members of the groups in the
Tindale et al. (1990) study were influential to the extent
that they prevented majority members from becoming even more
extreme in their final decision.

If this were the case, the

influence of the minority members would have been analogous
to a reign or a weight, holding the majority members back.
Unfortunately, the nature of the data in this investigation
do not allow us to explore this possibility.

In order to

measure directly the impact of minority factions, it is
critical to compare groups with minority factions to those
without such factions. Furthermore, Tindale et al. did not
attempt to address whether minority and majority influence
differ qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, as
proposed in recent theoretical work in this area (see
reviews by Levine, 1980; Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass &
Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987).
Qualitative Differences in Majority and Minority Influence
The models of social influence proposed by Latane
(1981), Tanford and Penrod (1984), and Mullen (1983) suggest
that minority and majority influence differ only
quantitatively, and, therefore, are part of the same
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underlying process.

In contrast, Moscovici (1980) argued

that minority and majority influence are qualitatively
different, with the former resulting in private acceptance
and eventual internalization of new ideas, and the latter
resulting only in public compliance. Furthermore, Moscovici
has attributed these differences to the behavioral style of
the source, and has identified several characteristics
typical of an influential minority source, including
autonomy, a lack of rigidity, the use of logical arguments,
fairness, and consistency.

Moscovici has argued that these

traits (presented by the source and/or perceived by the
recipient) lead the recipient of a message to process the
arguments differently, and that this different type of
processing leads to permanent attitude change.
Majority influence, according to Moscovici, is assumed
to provoke peripheral cognitive processes, leading only to
public compliance (see Chaiken, 1987 or Petty & Cacioppo,
1981 for a discussion of the differences between central
route and peripheral cognitive processing).

Tanford and

Penrod (1984) noted that the characteristics named by
Moscovici are not necessarily specific to minority
influence, and considered source consistency a critical
parameter for both majority and minority influence.
Moscovici's (1980) notion that minority influence is
more likely than majority influence to lead to permanent
internalization has led many theorists to explore the two
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influence types in light of a simple, but crucial,
experimental manipulation: private versus public expression
of attitude change.

Maass and Clark (1983) conducted two

experiments in an attempt to find support for such a dual
process model of social influence.

The authors employed a

methodological and theoretical synthesis of two
independently developed theories - one addressing attitude
change in general (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), and the other
specific to minority and majority influence (Moscovici,
1980).

Much in line with both Petty & Cacioppo's

elaboration likelihood model of attitude change, and
Moscovici's notion of conversion behavior, the authors
proposed that the underlying cognitive processes mediating
minority influence generate arguments and counterarguments
that lead to permanent attitude change.

Majority influence,

on the other hand, provokes peripheral cognitive processes
that lead to public compliance, rather than private
acceptance.
In Experiment 1, the authors were primarily interested
in the direction in which subjects' attitudes toward a
source would shift in public versus private situations.
They simultaneously exposed subjects to both majority and
minority influence sources. Subjects with moderate attitudes
toward gay rights were exposed to a summary of a discussion
about gay rights held by five college students at their
university.

In half of the conditions, four individuals
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(the majority) argued in favor of, and one individual (the
minority) argued against, gay rights.

In the other half of

the conditions, the majority and minority arguments were
reversed.

All subjects were then asked to respond to four

attitude scales regarding gay rights.
In the public compliance condition the subjects were
told that they would join the discussion group, and that
their response to the attitude scales would be seen by the
five students prior to their joining the group.

In the

private condition, the subjects placed their "anonymous"
responses to the attitude scales in a ballot box.
The results indicated that subjects shifted towards the
majority position in the public conditions and towards the
minority in the private conditions.

This difference in

shifting is also reported in many other studies attempting
to show the power of minority influence (Moscovici & Lage,
1976; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980; Personnaz, 1981).
Experiment 2 (Maass & Clark, 1983) was designed to
explore further the dual process model of social influence
by examining the arguments and counterarguments generated by
subjects in the same experimental conditions utilized in
Experiment 1. It was expected that the results from
Experiment 1 would be replicated.

The authors also

hypothesized that the minority source of influence would
stimulate the subjects to generate more arguments
counterarguments than would the majority source of

and
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influence. Finally, they also predicted that the generated
arguments would mediate private acceptance but not public
compliance.

After reading the discussion summary, each

subject was given fifteen minutes to fill six "idea spaces"
with arguments and counterarguments for each source of
influence.
The shift toward the minority in private, and toward
the majority in public was found once again in Experiment 2.
However, contrary to the second hypothesis, the minority
influence source failed to provoke the generation of more
arguments, regardless of direction.

The third, and perhaps

most critical, hypothesis: that generated arguments would
mediate private acceptance but not public compliance,was
supported.

This finding led the authors to propose that it

is not cognitive activity per se, but rather the quality of
cognitive activity

that accounts for differences in

shifting.
In line with this argument, Nemeth (1986) has proposed
that minority influence inspires individuals to think
divergently, whereas majority influence forces individuals
to think convergently. Divergent thinking (Guilford, 1956)
is characterized by idea "fluency" (the generation of many
ideas) and idea "flexibility" (the generation of ideas from
several distinct idea classes or categories), whereas
convergent thinking involves the generation of one idea that
is representative of the dominant or normative response set.
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The propensity of majority influence to provoke convergent
thinking has been explained theoretically in light of the
extensive literature on group creativity (Nemeth, 1986).
Interacting groups are less likely to generate an idea that
is more novel, atypical, or creative than are nominal groups
with individuals working alone (McGrath, 1984).

This

difference is probably the result of the tendency of the
individual group members to move toward uniformity, and of
each individual group member's fear of being ridiculed for
the generation of a "bad" idea.
Nemeth (1986) claimed that an individual facing
majority influence will behave in a similar manner (i.e.,
less likely to generate novel ideas) for the same reasons.
Minority influence, on the other hand, inspires the
individual to think about novel and creative ideas.

It is

not clear whether this process is the result of modeling
(e.g., individuals see other individuals who think in what
appears to be a divergent fashion and choose to do so
themselves), or if mere exposure to non-dominant arguments
inspires one to think divergently. Nevertheless, Nemeth
provides much experimental evidence in support of the notion
that minorities are more capable than majorities to inspire
divergent thinking (Nemeth & Kwan, 1985; Nemeth & Wachtler,
1983).
Perhaps most relevant to the approach taken in this
paper is the study by

Nemeth and Kwan (1985), in which it
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was shown not only that individuals who are exposed to
minority influence think more divergently, but also that
this thought style generalizes to subsequent unrelated
tasks.

Nemeth & Kwan (1985) first exposed subjects to

either majority or minority influence in a color perception
task (much like the technique used in earlier Moscovici
studies).

Following this task, subjects were asked to free

associate with the colors green and blue (the colors used in
the color perception task). Those who had been exposed to
minority influence in the previous task gave more original
responses (i.e., statistically infrequent according to a
normative list) than those who were exposed to majority
influence for both colors. These data also lend support to
the notion that majority influence provokes convergent
thinking, in that individuals who were exposed to majority
influence gave responses that were more conventional than a
control group that did not participate in the color
perception task.
Majority and minority influence have rarely been
studied in the context of freely interacting groups.

The

reliance on confederates in most studies of social influence
may have some very serious effects upon the results obtained
in such studies, and these effects may be most critical with
respect to minority influence.

Assuming that influence is

an interactive phenomenon, and that minority members will be
influenced by majority members and vice versa, it is
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critical to use true members of each influence type in order
to understand fully the impact of both majorities and
minorities.
Maass and Clark (1983) did make an attempt to expose
subjects to each influence type by using subjects whom they
assumed would consider themselves neither a member of the
majority nor the minority (they all had moderate attitudes
towards gay rights), but their method of accomplishing this
should be questioned.

The experimenters assumed that

subjects with moderate attitudes were neutral with respect
to gay rights, a potentially tenuous assumption.
Furthermore, a moderate attitude, by their definition, was
one that fell within the range of 2.75 and 5.25 on a seven
point scale.

Given the broad range of what the authors

consider moderate, it seems possible that subjects with an
"extreme moderate" (e.g., 5.25) pro attitude could consider
themselves as members of either the "pro gay rights"
minority or majority, rather than as a neutral figure.
Perhaps more important, even though subjects were being
exposed simultaneously to both influence types, they were
reading the arguments from a prepared script and had no
opportunity to act as influencing agents themselves, or to
experience the feedback from fellow group members. A better
method of accomplishing the simultaneous exposure to both
influence types would involve using freely interacting
groups with both minority and majority members.
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In light of the behavioral characteristics assumed to
be critical predictors of the degree to which a minority
member will be influential (perhaps with consistency being
the most important attribute), one could expect to find
different results when all minority and majority members are
truly allowed to become influenced and behave accordingly.
outline of the Present Study and Research Hypotheses
It was pointed out earlier that the impact of minority
factions cannot be completely understood or measured without
the use of a control group consisting of no minority
faction.

By contrasting the two types of group composition

(groups with a minority faction and groups with no minority
faction), one can draw conclusions with respect to the
amount of influence exerted by the minority faction. Such a
control group was utilized in the present study.

The main

purpose of this study was to measure the degree of minority
impact on majority members by comparing the post group
discussion attitudes for majority members in groups that do
versus do not contain a minority faction (i.e., unanimous
groups vs. groups with one or two minority members).

The

possibility that minority influence is qualitatively
different in nature was also explored.
It was hypothesized that unanimous groups will, on the
average, become more polarized in their final
post-discussion attitudes than those with minorities
present.

Similarly, groups with larger minority factions
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were hypothesized to be, on the average, more moderate than
those with only one minority member; that is, minorities of
two will be more powerful than minorities of one.

This

prediction is much in line with previous studies of minority
influence (Arbuthnot & Wayner, 1982; Bray Johnson, &
Chilstrom, 1982; Tindale et al., 1990), and with the three
models of social influence discussed earlier (Latane, 1981;
Mullen, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984).
Possible qualitative differences between the two
influence types were also explored using a method similar to
that used by Maass and Clark (1983).

It was hypothesized

that majority members in groups with a minority faction
would generate more thoughts than those in unanimous groups.
It was also hypothesized that the arguments generated by
individuals who were members of groups with a minority
faction would be more flexible in nature (representative of
both sides of the argument).
As mentioned earlier, Nemeth (1986) has concluded that
minorities inspire divergent thinking in different
conceptual domains.

As a direct test of this assertion, the

subjects in the present experiment were asked to generate
arguments for another social issue that was unrelated to the
issue they discussed as a group.

Thus, for this particular

issue it was expected that majority members of groups with
minority factions would generate more ideas as well as ideas
that were more flexible in nature, than members who were
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part of unanimous groups.

METHOD
subjects
The subjects were 150 undergraduate students drawn from
the Loyola University, Chicago subject pool.

The data were

collected in single gender groups in an attempt to avoid the
possibility of confounding gender and influence type.
Subjects participated for approximately one hour and
received course credit for their participation.
Design
Because the major factor of interest in this study was
group composition, five person groups with the following
compositions were formed: ten groups of five individuals, in
which all members were in favor of the government passing a
law that would establish English as the official language of
the United States; ten groups of five individuals, in which
four members were in favor and one member was opposed to the
government passing a law that would establish English as the
official language of the United States; and finally, ten
groups of five individuals, in which three members were in
favor and two members were opposed to the government passing
a law that would establish English as the official language
of the United States.
levels was used.

Thus, a one factor design with three

Several dependent measures designed to
18
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investigate the possible qualitative differences between
majority and minority influence were collected along with
post-discussion attitude scores.
Procedure
Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a large table.
They were informed that they would take part in a group
discussion, and that the discussion would be audiotaped.
First, subjects responded to a pretest comprised of two
questions regarding the government passing a law that would
establish English as the official language of the United
States (see Appendix A).

The first question required the

subjects to respond categorically (in favor/against) to the
issue of establishing English as the official language of
the United states, and the second question required them to
respond to a 21-point bipolar scale (ranging from 50 to -50
in intervals of 5, with a midpoint of zero) indicating the
degree to which he/she was in favor/against the issue. The
21-point bipolar scale was used in an attempt to minimize
the chances of obtaining ceiling effects. This particular
issue was selected based on pilot test data, collected
during the Fall semester 1991, that indicated that
approximately 85.4% of undergraduate psychology students
were in favor of, and 14.6% were opposed to the government
passing a law that would establish English as the official
language of the United states.

This distribution allowed

for the formation of groups according to the experimental
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design mentioned previously.
After responding to the pretest, subjects in the group
conditions were asked to discuss with their fellow group
members for approximately seven minutes the issue of our
government passing a law that would establish English as the
official language of the United States.

All discussions

were audiotaped in order to keep track of the arguments
generated during discussions, and of which source of
influence (minority or majority) generated each argument.
Group consensus was not required or requested.

After group

discussion, all subjects were asked to respond to the
100-point scale and to state their position regarding the
issue just discussed.

All subjects were then instructed to

work independently, and to generate a list of thoughts
relevant to the issue (see Appendix B). Although the
subjects were verbally instructed to generate only a list of
relevant thoughts regarding the issue, they were given two
sheets of paper divided into two columns
(arguments/counterarguments) and told to place each of their
thoughts in the appropriate column.

Subjects were told that

they should not feel as if they had to fill in an equal
number of spaces on each side, but rather to list all of the
thoughts that came to their mind.
After listing their thoughts, the subjects responded
both categorically and to a 21-point bipolar scale (ranging
from 50 to -50 in intervals of five with a midpoint of zero)
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regarding the issue of allowing homosexuals to marry legally
(see Appendix C).

The subjects were then asked to generate

thoughts regarding this issue (see Appendix D) using the
same format as for the first issue.

Upon completion of the

final task, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their
participation (see Appendix E).

Results
In the context of this study, minority and majority
influence can be gauged primarily by the direction of the
movement of subjects' responses on the 21-point bipolar
scale.

Theoretically,, this movement was predicted to be in

the opposite direction for minority and majority influence.
A different pattern of results was predicted for the
majority and minority members of each group.

Therefore, the

data obtained from members of minorities and majorities
within groups were analyzed separately.

The analyses

corresponding to the individuals who were majority members
in each group may be found under the minority influence
subheadings.

The analyses corresponding to the individuals

who were minority members in each group are presented under
the majority influence headings.
Myers, Dicecco, & Lorch (1981) argue that group level
data are often analyzed incorrectly because, in many
instances, the individual scores that comprise the group
averages are not independently distributed, that is, they
are correlated.

This tends to inflate the probability of

making a Type I error, because the variance attributable to
the covariation of individual scores contributes more to the
numerator than to the denominator of the test statistic.
22
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When the individual scores are correlated, and the unit of
analysis is the individual, quasi-E ratios should be
computed in order to ensure that the expected value of the
ratio under the null hypothesis equals one.

E

Therefore,

quasi-E ratios were computed where appropriate, as noted,
for the analyses reported below.
In order to test the hypotheses corresponding to
attitude change, change scores were computed for all
individuals.

Change scores were calculated by subtracting

the posttest attitude score from the prettest attitude
score.

The means for both the pretest and the posttest

attitude scores, for each condition are presented in Table 1
below.
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Table 1
Mean Attitude Scores and Standard Deviations at Pretest and
Posttest for Minority and Majority Influence Types
Condition
Unanimous
Groups
Group Member
Type
Minority

Majority

Pre

Post

***

***

31.8
13.4

36.8
12.2

Four Majority
Members
One Minority
Member
Pre
Post

.o

Three Majority
Two Minority
Members
Pre
Post

-25.0
13.5

17.8

-26.8
13.3

33.1
12.4

34.0
17.3

32.3
13.5

-18.8
16.5

Note. The first number corresponds to the mean attitude
score, the second number corresponds to the standard
deviation.
The mean change score for each influence type, for each
condition within the experimental design,is presented in
Table 2 below.

29.2
15.0
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Table 2
Mean Change Scores Standard Deviations and Cell Size
for Minority and Majority Influence Types
Condition
Unanimous
Groups
Group Member
Type
Minority

Majority

***

5.00
5.46
(n=50)

Four Majority
Members
One Minority
Member

Three Majority
Two Minority
Members

25.00
16.67
(n=lO)

8.00
9.41
(n=20)

.88
7.02
(n=40)

-3.17
4.11
(n=30)

Note. Positive change scores indicate movement toward the
majority position. Negative change scores indicate movement
toward minority position. The first number is the change
score mean, the second is the standard deviation, and the
third is the number of individuals within the cell.
Attitude Change Due to Minority Influence
It was hypothesized that individuals in groups with no
minority members (unanimous groups) would become more
extreme in their post-discussion attitudes than would
individuals in groups with one or two minority members
present.
A one-way analysis of variance (using the quasi-E
procedure described previously) with three levels (unanimous
groups, groups with one minority, groups with two
minorities) was performed on the change scores.

The

analysis of variance source table is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Change Scores
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
source
Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

2

1,336.03

23

128.25

Quasi

p

E

10.42

.01

.42

As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was
found.

Two a priori determined follow up tests were

performed.

The first compared the unanimous groups

condition to a weighted combination of the minority
influence conditions.

As predicted, the attitude change

scores of individuals who were members of unanimous groups
differed significantly from those of the individuals in both
minority influence conditions E'(l,19)

=

7.00, p < .025.

Unanimous groups became more extreme in their postdiscussion attitudes, whereas groups with one minority
member changed very little, and groups with two minority
members actually became less extreme (see Table 1 for
means).

The pattern of means supports the notion that

single minority members are influential in a way that
prevents the majority members from becoming more extreme.
The second follow-up test, contrary to expectations,
revealed that there were no significant differences between
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the two minority influence conditions, E'(l,16) = 2.47, n.s.
Possible changes in the dichotomous (In favor/Against)
responses were assessed using Fisher's Exact test.

The two

minority influence conditions were combined for this
analysis.

The number and relative frequency of individuals

who changed their position are presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Number and Relative Freguency of Change on Dichotomous
Response for Majority Members
Condition
Unanimous
Groups
Change

Groups with
Minority
Members

Yes

0
.00

2
.02

No

50
.42

68
.56

Note. The first number corresponds to the number of
individuals who changed/did not change on the dichotomous
response and the second number corresponds to the relative
frequency.
There was not a significant relationship between condition
(unanimous groups and minority influence) and changes in
position (In favor/Against) regarding the issue of
establishing English as the official language of the United
States, (Fisher's Exact, p =.34).
Attitude Change Due to Majority Influence
In order to test the hypothesis that minorities of one
would change in the direction of the majority more than
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would minorities of two, a one-way analysis of variance with
two levels (one minority member faced with a majority of
four and two minority members faced with a majority of
three) was performed on the change scores.

Once again,

quasi-E ratios were used in this analysis because the unit
of analysis is the

~ndividual.

The analysis of variance

source table is presented in Table 5.
Table 5
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Change Scores
Minorities of One and Minorities of Two
Source
Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

Quasi
E

1

2167.20

8.89

14

243.75

.01

.33

As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was
found.

Minorities of one clearly changed more than did

minorities of two (see Table 2 for means).

These results

are much in line with the predictions made by the three
models of social influence (Latane, 1981; Mullen, 1983; and
Tanford & Penrod, 1984).
Possible changes in the dichotomous (In favor/Against)
responses were assessed using a Fisher's exact test.

The

number and relative frequency of individuals who changed
their position are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6
Number and Relative Freguency of Change on Dichotomous
Response for Minority Members
Condition

Change

Groups with
One Minority
Member

Groups with
Two Minorities
Members

Yes

5
.17

4
.13

No

5
.17

16
.53

Note. The first number corresponds to the number of
individuals who changed/did not change on the dichotomous
response and the second number corresponds to the relative
frequency.
There was not a significant relationship between condition
(minority of one, minorities of two) and changes in position
(In favor/Against) regarding the issue of establishing
English as the official language of the United States,
(Fisher's Exact, p =.10).
Minority Influence Thought Listing Analyses
The arguments and counterarguments generated by each
subject were content analyzed by four independent coders
(each set of data was rated by two coders).

Each coder

determined whether the statements listed represented
thoughts in favor of (arguments), against
(counterarguments), or irrelevant to the issue, which was
either establishing English as the official language of the
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United States or allowing homosexuals to marry legally.

The

interobserver reliability (percentage agreement) averaged
across all coders for the entire data set was approximately
95%.

The number of arguments and counterarguments listed by

each individual were used to compute two sets of cognitive
activity scores for both issues.

Cognitive fluency scores

were computed by adding the listed arguments to the listed
counterarguments.

Cognitive flexibility scores were

determined by subtracting counterarguments from arguments
and dividing by the cognitive fluency score.
value of this ratio was used in the analyses.

The absolute
Therefore,

the cognitive flexibility scores could range from

o (perfect

flexibility, that is, the generation of an equal number of
arguments and counterarguments) to 1 (the generation of
either arguments or counterarguments only).
Minority Influence Cognitive Fluency Analyses: English
Language Issue
In order to test the hypothesis that influence type
would have an effect upon the number of arguments and
counterarguments individuals would generate regarding
establishing English as the official language of the United
States, a one-way analysis of variance with three levels
(unanimous groups, majority members exposed to one minority,
and majority members exposed to two minorities) was
performed on the cognitive fluency scores for this issue.
The analysis of variance source table is presented in Table
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7 below.
Table 7
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Cognitive Fluency
Establishing English as the Official Language of U.S.
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source
Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

Quasi

2

35.43

3.86

22

9.18

p

E
.05

.19

As predicted, a significant main effect for condition was
found.

An a priori determined follow up test revealed that

unanimous groups had lower cognitive fluency scores
(M=6.740) than majority members exposed to one minority

member (M=7.925), and majority members exposed to two
minority members (M=7.700), E'(l,24) = 4.47, p < .05

In

order to determine whether the differences found between
conditions was due to individuals exposed to minority
influence generating more counterarguments only, two one-way
analyses of variance with three levels were performed on the
number of arguments and counterarguments generated for
establishing English as the official language of the United
States.

The analysis of variance source table corresponding

to total arguments generated in favor of establishing
English as the official language of the United States is
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presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Arguments
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

2

17.53

24

4.84

Quasi

E
3.62

R

.16

.05

A significant main effect for condition was found.

A follow

up test comparing unanimous groups (M=4.56) to a weighted
average of the two minority influence conditions, that is
groups exposed to a minority of one (M=5.25), and groups
exposed to two minority members (M=4.87), while not
statistically significant, showed a trend in the predicted
direction E'(l,25) = 4.08, R < .10.

Individuals exposed to

minority influence did not generate significantly more
arguments than individuals in unanimous groups.

The second

one-way analysis of variance with three levels was performed
on the number of counterarguments generated by the
individuals within each condition.

The analysis of variance

source table for counterarguments generated is presented in
Table 9.
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Table 9
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Counterarguments
unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Degrees
of
Freedom

Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Mean
Square

2

9.67

24

4.48

Quasi

.E

2.15

.25

The mean number of counterarguments generated by unanimous
groups (M=2.18), groups exposed to one minority (M=2.67) and
groups exposed to two minority members (M=2.833) did not
differ significantly.
Minority Influence Cognitive Flexibility Analyses: English
Language Issue
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals
exposed to minority influence would list thoughts that were
more flexible in nature (i.e., were representative of both
sides of the issue) a one-way analysis of variance was
performed on the individual cognitive fluency scores for
establishing English as the official language of the United
States.

The analysis of variance source table corresponding

to the analysis of cognitive fluency scores for the issue of
establishing English as the official language of the...,...__/United
....
.·

States is presented in Table 10.

~
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Table 10.
Analysis of Variance Source Table: English Flexibility
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source
Between
Groups
Within
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Mean
Square

2

.1887

20

.1226

Quasi

E
1.53

.25

The cognitive flexibility scores for individuals who were
members of unanimous groups (M=.3861) did not differ
significantly from individuals who were exposed to a
minority of one (M=.3893), or individuals who were exposed
to two minority members (M=.2960).
Cognitive Fluency Analyses:Homosexuals Legally Marrying
Issue
It was hypothesized that individuals who were exposed
to minority influence would generate more arguments and
counterarguments than would individuals who were members of
unanimous groups on a subsequent issue (allowing homosexuals
to marry legally), unrelated to the issue discussed as a
group. It is important to note at this point that the
individual members of the group were not aware of their
fellow group members' opinions on this particular issue.

An

individual was classified as either a minority member or
majority member based only on their response to the issue of

35

establishing English as the official language of the United
States.

It was quite feasible that many of the individuals

classified as majority members had minority opinions within
their respective group regarding this second issue, but the
data were collected in such a way that these individuals
were never made aware of how their response compared to
others.

The issue of interest with regard to the following

analysis is whether the pattern of results with respect to
cognitive activity could be replicated for a subsequent
issue not discussed as a group. In order to test this
hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance with three levels
(Unanimous groups, minority of one, two minorities) was
performed on the cognitive fluency score.

Quasi-E ratios

were not used for this particular analysis, because there
was no group interaction (i.e., discussion, knowledge of one
another's position etc.) for this issue.
The analysis of variance source table corresponding to
this analysis is presented in Table 11.
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Table 11
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Cognitive Fluency
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Between
Groups

2

31.72

Within
Groups

117

600.87

Total

119

632.59

Mean
Square

15.86

E

I!

3.08

.05

!M.2

.04

5.14

A significant main effect for condition was found.

A

follow up test comparing unanimous groups (M=5.60) to a
weighted average of the two minority influence conditions,
that is groups exposed to a minority of one (N=6.75), and
groups exposed to two minority members (M=6.43) revealed
that the differences between unanimous and minority
influence groups was significant
I! < .05.

E

(1,117)=5.63,

In order to determine whether there were

differences between conditions with respect to the type of
thoughts generated (arguments/counterarguments), two one-way
analyses of variance with three levels were performed on the
number of arguments and counterarguments generated for
allowing homosexuals to marry legally.

It should be noted

that arguments/counterarguments were reverse scored for
individuals who expressed that they were against allowing
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homosexuals to marry legally.

In other words, individuals

against allowing homosexuals to marry legally would have
placed thoughts in line with their opinion in the
counterarguments column and the thoughts against their
position in the arguments column.

The analysis of variance

corresponding to arguments generated is presented in Table
12.
Table 12
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Arguments
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Between
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

.E

.14

2

.85

.42

Within
Groups

117

345.02

2.95

Total

119

345.87

p

fil.2

.87

There was not a significant main effect for condition with
respect to the number of arguments (thoughts in favor of the
individuals respective position).

The second one-way

analysis of variance was performed on the number of
counterarguments (thoughts generated against one's position)
generated.

The analysis of variance source table is

presented in Table 13.
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Table 13
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Counterarguments
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally
unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Between
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

2

23.50

11.75

Within
Groups

117

332.49

2.84

Total

119

355.99

p

:E

4.14

.02

!!!.2

.05

This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
condition.

A follow up test compared the mean number of

counterarguments generated by individuals who were members
of unanimous groups (M=l.64) to a weighted average of the
mean number of counterarguments generated by individuals who
were faced with one minority member (M=2.60), and
individuals who were faced with two minority members
(M=2.43).

This analysis revealed that individuals who were

exposed to minority influence generated more
counterarguments than individuals who were members of
unanimous groups, :E (1,117)= 7.95, p < .01.
Cognitive Flexibility Analyses: Homosexuals Marrying Legally
Issue
It was also hypothesized that individuals who were
members of groups with minority members would generate
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thoughts that were more flexible in nature than would
individuals who were members of unanimous groups for the
issue of allowing homosexuals to marry legally.

In order to

test this hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance with
three levels (individuals in unanimous groups, individuals
exposed to one minority member, and individuals exposed to
two minority members) was performed on the flexibility
scores for the issue of allowing homosexuals to marry
legally.

The analysis of variance source table for this

analysis is presented in Table 14.
Table 14
Analysis of Variance Source Table: Cognitive Flexibility
Allowing Homosexuals to Marry Legally
Unanimous Groups and Groups Exposed to Minority Influence
Source

Between
Groups

Degrees
of
Freedom

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

2

.102

.05

Within
Groups

117

12.917

.11

Total

119

13.019

p

.46

.63

Contrary to expectations, the cognitive flexibility scores
did not differ significantly for individuals who were
members of unanimous groups (M=.4711), individuals who were
exposed to one minority member (M=.4036), and individuals
who were exposed to two minority members (M=.4352).

Discussion
This study was designed to measure directly the impact
of minority members upon majority members within the context
of freely interacting groups by comparing groups with
minority members to those without minority members.

More

specifically, this study was an attempt to understand better
the possible qualitative differences between minority and
majority influence.
The mathematical models of social influence reviewed in
the introduction of this paper and the empirical test of
these models conducted by Tindale et al. (1990) all suggest
that minorities of one have relatively little impact upon
majorities.

It was suggested at the outset of this paper

that such a conclusion may be premature because the
possibility that minority members reduce the degree of
polarization in majority members' attitudes had yet to be
explored.

The overall pattern of mean change scores

obtained in this study offer somewhat tentative empirical
support for the notion that minority influence is analogous
to a reign or a weight preventing the majority's movement
toward a more extreme position.

Although the groups that

were exposed to a minority of one did shift in the direction
of the majority, this shift was very slight (not even one
40
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point on the 21-point scale), relative to that of the
unanimous groups (five points on the 21-point scale).
The prevailing paradigm in the study of social
influence has consistently defined influence as movement
toward a particular position (i.e., changes in preferences,
attitudes etc.).

In light of the results obtained in the

present study, the dependence upon shifting as evidence that
influence has occurred poses a special problem for the study
of minority influence.

Minority influence (especially in

the case of single minorities) may not be strong enough to
produce shifts toward the minority position, but this should
not necessarily be taken as evidence that no influence has
occurred.

For example, the results presented in Table 4

revealed that only two of the 40 individuals exposed to
minority influence changed their position (In Favor/Against)
on the language issue.

Clearly, the minority members in

this study were not influential enough to cause a change in
position.

On the other hand, the minority members were

influential in that they were either able to reduce the
degree of polarization in the majority members' attitudes,
or cause majority members to shift toward their position.
Although it is empirically difficult to measure the type of
influence that is being alluded to, the methodology utilized
in the present study (a unanimous groups control condition),
certainly appears to be promising method of studying
minority influence.
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The overall pattern of means for the minority members
within each group was in line with the predictions made by
the three models of social influence (Latane, 1981; Mullen,
1983; and Tanford & Penrod, 1984).

As the number of

minorities increased and the number of majorities decreased,
the shifts toward the majority position became less extreme.
The results of the present study fail to offer
straightforward support for the notion that minority and
majority influence differ qualitatively.

Although

individuals who were members of unanimous groups had
significantly lower cognitive fluency scores than the
individuals who were exposed to minority influence for the
issue of establishing English as the official language of
the United states, the pattern of results obtained when
arguments and counterarguments were analyzed separately were
somewhat counterintuitive.

The fact that the three

experimental groups differed significantly with respect to
the number of arguments generated, but not with respect to
the number of counterarguments generated is certainly not in
line with the notion that minorities inspire divergent
thinking.

A divergent thought style for the majority

members exposed to minority influence would involve the
generation of more counterarguments than the unanimous group
members.

These results become even more puzzling when one

considers that the majority members who were exposed to
minority influence were certainly more likely to hear
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arguments against their position than were the individuals
who were members of unanimous groups.
The results found are somewhat suggestive of McGuire's
(1964) inoculation theory.

This theory suggests that when

an individual is faced with weak counterarguments against
her/his position, these counterarguments prompt the
individual to generate more thoughts in line with their own
position in an attempt to refute the weak counterarguments.
The theory also suggests that these refutational defenses
serve to bolster the attitude of the individual.

This does

not seem to be the case in this particular study because the
results obtained for the attitude change scores indicate
that the minority members were influential.

Of course, it

cannot be assumed that the arguments and counterarguments
generated by the individuals mediated their attitude change
because the thoughts were listed after the individuals
responded to the post-discussion attitude scale, not before.
The differences between the groups with respect to the
thought listing data for the second issue (allowing
homosexuals to marry legally) suggest that individuals
generate more thoughts regarding a subsequent, unrelated
issue when they are exposed to minority influence than when
they are members of a unanimous group.

The interesting

difference between the results obtained from the analyses of
the two issues is that the results from the second issue are
much more in line with what would be expected within the
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divergent thinking paradigm than are the results of the
first issue.

Individuals exposed to minority influence did

not generate significantly more arguments (i.e., thoughts in
favor of their own position) than the members of unanimous
groups, but they did generate more thoughts against their
position.

Nemeth (1986) has consistently shown, using a

variety of dependent variables, that individuals exposed to
minority influence not only think more divergently, but that
this thought style generalizes to subsequent, unrelated
tasks.

The present study attempted to replicate this

finding using a different dependent variable (i.e., thought
listing data).

The present study successfully replicated

the finding for the second issue, but failed to do so for
the first issue.

It is difficult to attribute the pattern

of results to any one factor, for the thought listing data
for the two issues are not entirely equivalent.

That is,

the first issue was discussed as a group and the thoughts
generated were more than likely affected by the group
discussion, whereas the thoughts listed for the second issue
were the product of an individual effort.

Once again,

McGuire's (1964) inoculation theory may be useful in
explaining these differences.

For the first issue,

individuals had to actively participate in a conversation
regarding the issue, and because they actually heard the
counterarguments generated by the minority members, they may
have focused primarily upon generating refutational
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defenses.

There was no need to defend one's position for

the second issue, therefore, it was not necessary for the
individual to direct his/her cognitive activity toward
defending his/her position.

The absence of motivation to

defend their own position may have allowed individuals to
think more divergently about the issue.
The differences found in cognitive activity for each
issue also point out the importance of studying majority and
minority influence in freely interacting groups.

It is

quite possible that group interaction or the expectation
that one will have to interact with group members who have
differing opinions leads to a different type of cognitive
activity.

The studies supporting the notion that minority

and majority influence differ qualitatively (e.g., Maass, &
Clark, 1984; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983),
have failed to consider this important difference because,
in most cases, interaction with other group members was
impossible (e.g., reading a prepared script of minority
arguments).

It was mentioned at the outset of this paper

that a different pattern of results might be obtained when
minority and majority members actually interact.

This

hypothesized difference was attributed to the interactive
nature of social influence (i.e., minority members
influencing and becoming influenced by majority members and
vice versa).

Although the results of this study reveal

differences with respect to cognitive activity when the
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groups interacted and when they did not, the data do not
allow for the identification of exactly what brought about
this change.

It is quite possible that the subjects began

to generate arguments in favor of their position as soon as
they realized that they would have to discuss the issue.

It

is also possible that the difference in cognitive activity
was brought about after being exposed to the minority
arguments.

The former explanation has been supported

recently by Levine (1991), where individuals who expected to
interact with minority or majority members generated more
arguments consistent with their own position than
individuals who did not expect to interact with others.
Nonetheless, more research directed toward this issue
certainly needs to be conducted.
The differences in cognitive activity found with
respect to the two issues could also be attributed to
something inherent in the issue of allowing homosexuals to
marry legally.

The arguments and counterarguments generated

for this particular issue seemed qualitatively different
from those generated for establishing English as the
official language of the United States.

The individuals'

position with respect to the issue seemed more apparent when
reading over their listed thoughts. This difference, of
course, has important implications for the coding of the
arguments and counterarguments.

If the coders felt as if

they could successfully guess the position of the
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individual, this perceived knowledge could have biased their
counting of the arguments and counterarguments.

Although

the intraobserver reliability was quite high (95%), each of
the coders could have been affected in the same manner.
Such an outcome would not have altered their overall
agreement rate.
The thoughts generated for the issue of establishing
English as the official language of the United States seemed
to be based more on facts and on the hypothetical
implications of establishing such a law, whereas the
thoughts generated for the issue of allowing homosexuals to
marry legally seemed to be more subjective and affect laden
(e.g., being sickened at the thought of homosexuals,
considering homosexuals not worthy of their civil rights).
It may be that it is more difficult for individuals to
generate arguments against their position when the issue
lends itself to the generation of facts rather than
feelings.

That is, one would have to have adequate

knowledge of or be quite familiar with the implications of
establishing English as the official language of the United
States in order to generate a list of arguments and
counterarguments regarding the issue.

The differences found

between the two issues may be due, in part, to different
levels of familiarity

with the implications of allowing

homosexuals to marry legally and establishing English as the
official language of the United States.
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It is important to note, at this point, that the
thought listing data collected in this study may not reflect
completely all of the thoughts the individuals were thinking
at the time, and the results obtained in this study should
certainly be interpreted in light of this flaw.

Although

all individuals were given ten minutes to list all of the
thoughts they had for both issues, most individuals did not
write for the entire ten minutes.

Furthermore, even though

subjects were instructed to work independently on each task,
the experimenter noticed that once it became obvious that
one individual in the group had stopped writing, it was only
a matter of moments before the other four individuals did
the same.

If individuals started listing the thoughts in

favor of their position and moved to the counterarguments
column after the arguments column, (or vice versa for the
second issue when the individual was against allowing
homosexuals to marry legally) the pattern of results
obtained are as would be expected given for the first issue,
given that the individuals may have discontinued writing not
because they had listed all of their thoughts against the
issue, but rather because it appeared as if other members of
the group had stopped writing.

This flaw could have been

avoided had the individuals been moved from the large table
and seated in such a way that would make the monitoring of
others writing behavior impossible.

Although this flaw may

help explain the failure to find significant differences
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between groups with respect to the number of
counterarguments generated for the first issue, it is not
clear why the obtained results for the second issue reveal a
significant difference with respect to the number of
counterarguments generated.
The mean flexibility scores for both establishing
English as the official language and allowing homosexuals to
marry legally fail to support the notion that the cognitive
activity of individuals who are exposed to minority
influence is more flexible in nature.

Although the results

of one study certainly should not be overgeneralized, and
these results should be interpreted in light of the
previously mentioned flaw in the collection of the thought
listing data, it may be beneficial to investigate
alternative measures of divergent thinking.

For example,

the novelty of the arguments and counterarguments for a
particular issue could be explored.
It should be noted that the individuals who coded the
arguments and counterarguments were instructed to consider
all thoughts in favor of and against the issue regardless of
the degree to which they were grounded in reality.

That is,

fallacious arguments (e.g., "Columbus discovered America and
he spoke English, therefore the official language of the
United states should be English"; "allowing homosexuals to
marry legally would increase the spread of AIDS"; "allowing
homosexuals to marry would increase the incidence of
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homosexuality") were considered to be just as valid as
thoughts that were more in line with reality.

In addition,

arguments and counterarguments that were similar in
implication but applied to different domains (e.g.,
"establishing English as the official language of the United
states would reduce the amount of money spent on bilingual
street signs"; "establishing English as the official
language of the United states would reduce the amount of
money spent teaching immigrants and their children to speak
the language") were considered to be separate thoughts, even
though they are representative of the general argument,
establishing English as the official language of the United
States would reduce the amount of money this country spends
accommodating non-English speakers. Perhaps flexibility
should not be measured in terms of the quantity, but rather
in terms of the quality of arguments/counterarguments
generated.
The present study attempted to establish a higher level
of ecological validity than is typically found in minority
and majority influence studies in that each influence type
was investigated within the context of freely interacting
groups without the use of confederates.

It was suggested

that a different pattern of results than is typically found
might be obtained because minority and majority members were
truly allowed to become influenced and behave accordingly.
The fact that the results from this study did not deviate to
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any great extent from the results obtained in past research
(with the exception of the cognitive activity results),
certainly should not minimize the importance of studying
influence within the context of freely interacting groups.
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APPENDIX A
English Attitude Scale

Code
Seat

Please answer the following two questions.

1.

I

am

Against

In Favor of

our government passing a law that would make
English the official language of the United States.

2. Please circle the number below which best represents your

opinion at this time concerning our government passing a
law that would make English the official language of the
United States

+50+45+40+35+30+25+20+15+10+5 0-5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50

Extremely

Quite

Somewhat

Somewhat

IN FAVOR

Quite
AGAINST
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Extremely

APPENDIX B
English Thought Listing Form
Code
Seat
In the spaces provided below, please list all of your
thoughts about our government passing a law that would make
English the official language of the United states. You
will notice that there are separate columns for arguments
and counterarguments. Place all of your thoughts in favor
of passing a law that makes English the official language of
the United States in the arguments column. Place all of
your thoughts against passing a law that makes English the
official language of the United states in the
counterarguments column. Please do not feel as if you need
to fill in an equal number of spaces on each side. It is
very important, though, that you list every argument and
counterargument that comes to mind. Please list each
thought separately.
ARGUMENTS

COUNTERARGUMENTS
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APPENDIX C
Homosexuals Marrying Attitude Scale
Code
Seat

Please answer the following two questions.
1.

I am

In Favor of

Against

allowing homosexuals to marry legally.

2.Please circle the number below which best represents your
opinion at this time concerning allowing homosexuals to
marry legally.
+50+45+40+35+30+25+20+15+10+5 0-5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50

Extremely

Quite

Somewhat

Somewhat

IN FAVOR

Quite
AGAINST
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Extremely

APPENDIX D
Homosexuals Marrying Thought Listing Form
Code
Seat
In the spaces provided below, please list all of your thoughts
about allowing homosexuals to marry legally. You will notice
that
there
are
separate
columns
for
arguments
and
counterarguments.
Place all of your thoughts in favor of
allowing homosexuals to marry legally in the arguments column.
Place all of your thoughts against allowing homosexuals to
marry legally int the counterarguments column. Please do not
feel as if you need to fill in an equal number of spaces on
each side. It is very important, though, that you list every
argument ad counterargument that comes to mind. Please list
each thought separately.
ARGUMENTS

COUNTERARGUMENTS
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APPENDIX F
Debriefing Form
Most research regarding minority and majority influence
in small groups seems to show that minority members are not as
influential as majority members because their numbers are
smaller.
Most models of social influence predict the same
relationship, that is, there is strength in numbers.
This
study was designed to measure directly the impact of minority
members upon the majority members by comparing groups with
minority members (individuals who disagree with the majority
of their group members) to those without minority members
(i.e., unanimous groups). More specifically, this study is an
attempt to look at the type of impact minorities have upon
majorities, as there is quite a bit of experimental and
theoretical work suggesting that there are differences between
majority and minority influence.
If you should have any questions regarding this study,
please feel free to contact the experimenter, Christine Smith,
at 508-3031 or stop by her office in Darnen Hall room 661.
Should you care to read more about this particular area of
research, the following references would be a great place to
start. Thank you very much for your participation.
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